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Abstract. Organizations and their computer infrastructures have grown intertwined in complex 
relationships through mergers, acquisitions, reorganizations, and cooperative service delivery. 
Consequently,  defensive actions and policy changes by one organization  may have far-reaching 
negative consequences on the partner organizations. Human-centric and machine-centric approaches are 
insufficient for defending the security of today's increasingly complex computer infrastructures.  The 
former are slow but highly adaptive, while the latter are fast but highly specialized. We believe the 
solution lies in mixed-initiative defenses combining the complementary qualities of both human- and 
machine-based approaches. We describe the Cooperative Infrastructure Defense (CID), a new cyber-
defense paradigm designed to unify complex-adaptive swarm intelligence, logical rational agents, and 
human insight. CID will enable cooperative defense of infrastructure through situational awareness 
using visualization, security policy dialogue between humans and agents, shared initiative in solving 
cyber problems, and a foundation for building trust between humans and agents within and between 
organizations.  
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1  Background 
Computer infrastructures consist of multiple interdependent organizations that share computational 
resources in a formal or ad hoc arrangement.  In critical infrastructures such as electrical power grids, 
organizations may be so interdependent that failure of some part of a single company could produce 
cascading failures with consequences on the local, national or international scale.  Regardless of the degree 
of their interdependence, infrastructure members remain economically independent organizations. They 
have separately managed systems, few shared policies, differing business drivers, and proprietary 
information that cannot be shared without special legal instruments.   
To manage the complexity, we factor these multi-organization cyber infrastructures into enclaves, a set of 
computer and network hardware and software that is owned by a single organization and administered 
under a unified policy by a single (possibly separate) organization.  An enclave may be very small, 
consisting of one or two machines, or it may be very large, comprising numerous networks.  Enclaves are 
the building blocks of infrastructures and are the largest unit over which a mixed-initiative system [1] can 
be fielded without crossing proprietary boundaries between organizations.  
Accomplishing concerted cyber defensive action that spans organizational boundaries is difficult.   
Infrastructures have unique cyber security needs that cannot be adequately addressed by individual 
enterprise solutions, and the complicated relationships in infrastructures make it possible for defensive 
actions by one organization to affect the others adversely [2].  Both legal [3, 4] and practical issues require 
that the consequences of change be managed through coordination across organizations in a near-real-time 
manner.  
Cyber adversaries, on the other hand, are not hindered by central coordination; they can rapidly and 
concertedly disrupt multi-organizational computer infrastructures.  Therefore, enclave defenders need 
intelligent defenses with the autonomy to adapt in real-time to both internal and external threats.  The real-
time nature of threats on the Internet requires that humans not become a bottleneck, and the seriousness of 
proprietary boundaries requires that automated defenses strictly observe the policies of the cooperating organizations.  A mixed-initiative approach solves these problems by allowing not only shared control 
between humans and software agents but also shared initiative among human stakeholders across the 
infrastructure.   
Current cyber defense systems involve humans at multiple levels, but people are often far down in the 
control structure, requiring them to make too many time-critical decisions. Information flow between 
humans is slow and frequently asynchronous. In a crisis, humans may be unable to cooperate because of 
culture, language, legal, proprietary, availability, or other obstacles. Such systems cannot adapt to the 
Internet speeds of cyber threats.  Consequently, effective cyber defense requires a framework that 
simultaneously capitalizes on the adaptability of humans and the speed of machines.  In other words, 
humans must be put in the right loop to maximize their effectiveness while preserving their legal 
responsibility for the actions of their autonomic systems [4]. 
2  Introduction 
This paper presents a new mixed-initiative hierarchical framework of humans and agents that is well suited 
to protecting computational infrastructures. The framework, Cooperative Infrastructure Defense (CID), is 
designed to rapidly adapt to new cyber attacks via swarming software agents while enabling humans to 
supervise the system at an appropriate level. We interpose a hierarchy of rational software agents between 
the swarm and the human supervisors to provide a channel for system guidance and feedback. Using 
various kinds of rationality actually turns false positives into beneficial forms of positive feedback and 
improves system performance. 
CID represents a revolutionary new way of looking at system control for cyber security.  Traditionally, 
humans control the entire system assisted by automated tools and subsystems.  In CID, agents share the 
decision-making power, handling most of the real-time portion autonomously but enabling human 
involvement at all levels. The human supervisor does not directly control the system rather humans exert 
supervisory influence sharing the initiative for action with their software agents. CID is designed to be a 
scalable, dynamic, and robust framework for securing increasingly complex computational infrastructures.  
CID makes humans an intrinsic part of the solution, engaging them without requiring them to directly 
control and enables diverse organizations within an infrastructure to cooperate in an adaptive cyber 
defense.  
In our research, we have created simulations of the entire framework, prototypes of the user interface, and 
prototypes of the mobile sensor agents.  Our initial prototype, built in an agent simulation framework, was 
demonstrated at the VizSec 2008 conference. We are currently implementing the framework in Java using 
the JADE agent framework (http://jade.tilab.com/) on a network of virtual machines.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. CID is described at a high level in Section 3. Section 4 
describes examples of human-agent and agent-agent interaction in the CID framework. Section 5 discusses 
related work. The conclusion outlines possible directions for future research, summarizes the CID 
framework, and reviews the expected benefits. 
3  System Overview 
In CID humans and various types of software agents share the responsibilities of securing an infrastructure 
comprised of enclaves that belong to member organizations. Figure 1 shows how one human can supervise 
a multi-enclave system with a few enclave-level agents, a host-level agent at each machine or group of 
similar machines, and a large swarm of simple mobile agents. Our terminology is as follows: 
•  Humans function as Supervisors. They provide guidance to and receive feedback from one or 
more enclaves. They must to take action only when the lower-level agents encounter a problem 
that requires human involvement.  Supervisors may take initiative as desired inspecting and 
guiding any element of the system. However, direct human control of the system is discouraged 
because such involvement would destroy its natural adaptive abilities. •  Enclave-level agents called Sergeants, which are each responsible for the security state of an 
entire enclave. Sergeants may make service agreements with Sergeants of other enclaves. 
Sergeants dialogue with humans to gain guidance for running the system according to business 
drivers and human security policies.  Sergeants create and enforce executable policies for the 
entire enclave. 
•  Host-level agents called Sentinels, which are responsible for protecting and configuring a single 
host or a collection of similarly configured hosts such as a cluster or storage network. Sentinels 
interact with human supervisors only when they need clarification about how to classify 
ambiguous evidence from the swarm. 
•  Swarming agents, called Sensors, roam from machine to machine within their enclaves searching 
for problems and reporting to the appropriate Sentinel. Sensors are diverse; their classifiers are 
each uniquely derived from the set of known problem indicators. Sensors use stigmergic messages 
called digital pheromone [5] to communicate. 
 
 
Figure 1: CID is a hierarchical framework of human supervisors, enclave-level rational agents, and swarming 
agents. A single human may supervise multiple enclaves via the agent hierarchy. 
The concept of supervisors and agents of the CID framework operating within a hierarchical structure is 
supported by the research of Parunak [6], Smieja [7], and Selfridge [8], who each suggested hierarchical 
arrangements of heterogeneous agents. Interposing logic-based rational agents between the humans and the 
swarm provides a basis for communication, interaction, and shared initiative. The hierarchical arrangement 
gives humans a single point of influence that allows multiple points of effect. The following sections 
describe the roles of each actor in the CID and the relationships between actors are depicted in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Cooperation among humans and agents in CID. 
3.1  Supervisors 
At the top layer of Figure 1 and Figure 2 are human supervisors who may direct one or more enclaves. 
Supervisors may belong to one or more interdependent organizations within the infrastructure, while the 
cyber assets in every enclave all belong to a single organization by definition. A Supervisor might also be a 
member of a regulatory organization or law enforcement agency and only monitor the equipment in the 
enclaves.  Human supervisors translate business policy into guidance via natural-language and graphical 
controls for top-level agents called Sergeants.   
3.2  Sergeants 
Each enclave has a top-level agent called a Sergeant.  In autonomic computing [9] terms, the Sergeant 
corresponds to the orchestrating autonomic manager.  Sergeants provide situational awareness to their 
Supervisor, via an information visualization interface. Sergeants translate the guidance from the human 
Supervisor into actionable policy across all the machines within an enclave. We believe this will involve a 
natural-language dialogue that accepts human guidance and feeds back what the translation will be in terms 
of policy similar to IBM’s SPARCLE (Server Privacy ARrchitecture and CapabiLity Enablement) policy 
workbench [10].  Sergeants will employ supervised learning algorithms so that interactions with them 
become more efficient over time. Sergeants are “heavy-weight” rational agents that make decisions based 
on logic. One possible implementation we have considered for Sergeants is Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) 
logic [11]. The Sergeant presents the activities of lower-level agents to the human Supervisor and functions 
as an interface to influence system operation.  Supervisors use Sergeants to enact environmental settings 
and policies that govern the general operation of the lower-level agents without controlling the lower-level 
agents directly. Sergeants provide a “geography” for the enclave that enables the swarm to operate 
properly. 
Another major function of Sergeants is to broker agreements between CID enclaves on behalf of the 
Supervisors. To ensure that their actions are properly attributable, Sergeants must have a separate digital 
identification from the Supervisor they report to. Since they negotiate on behalf of humans, they may incur 
liability for their owning organization. Thus, there must be a mechanism to describe the types and degrees 
of authority the Supervisor has delegated to the Sergeant. Often, this authorization can be quantified in 
terms of maximum dollars that can be spent or types of service contracts that can be negotiated. An 
example interaction using this mechanism is described in Section 4.65. 3.3  Sentinel 
Sentinels are mid-level rational software agents that, together with its managed host(s), correspond to the 
notion of autonomic elements. In autonomics parlance [9], the Sentinel is the Autonomic Manager and the 
host is the Managed Element. Each Sentinel is responsible for a single machine or group of machines that 
are similarly configured. For example, a Sentinel might be responsible for a single server, a router, a 
storage area network, a group of load-balanced web servers, or even a set of managed user workstations. 
Sentinels implement the policy they receive from the Sergeant and apply it to the configurations of the 
machine(s) they manage.  
Sentinels also interface with the lowest-level agents: the swarming Sensor agents that gather information on 
potential problems found on the hosts. Sentinels provide the local geography to Sensors and provide 
mobility by negotiating with their destination.  Sentinels also provide rewards and spawning capabilities to 
visiting Sensors. The Sentinels combine evidence from the Sensors with their own experience, shared 
knowledge from other Sentinels, guidance from Sergeants and Supervisors (interpreted by the Sergeant), 
and contextual host information to determine whether a problem exists and to devise potential solutions.  
Mechanisms similar to this are used in survivability architecture Willow [12].  
Sentinels give feedback on the utility of Sensor findings in the form of “rewards” to the Sensors that visit 
their nodes.  The analogy of foraging ants is used to describe the effect this feedback has on the system. By 
rewarding visiting Sensors, the Sentinel will attract more of them.  A variety of visiting Sensors will 
provide more information on the potential problems experienced by the Sentinel and enable it to make 
more informed decisions about how to fix the problems.  
3.4  Sensor 
Sensors are lightweight, swarming, mobile software agents that roam and detect problems. They are 
modeled after behaviors of social insects and they employ a form of ant-colony algorithms and swarm 
intelligence [13].  The Sensors' logic is as simple as possible; their power is in their numbers and their 
diversity. Sensors wander across the geography superimposed on the enclave by randomly adjusting their 
current heading similar to the movement of real ants. Each Sensor uses a learning classifier [14] to match a 
particular set of conditions in the hosts they visit. There are two broad categories of Sensors: Markovian 
(memoryless) and differential. Markovian Sensors look for static conditions that may either define 
signatures of known problems or well-known anomalous conditions. Differential Sensors look for 
differences in conditions between hosts in recent memory and their current host. For example, there may be 
an unusual rate of network connections, a large number of open files, strange file names in system 
directories, or unusually high processor utilization. 
Sensors communicate with each other stigmergically via trails of digital pheromone [5] messages. 
Decentralized, pheromone-based systems have been demonstrated to simply and effectively solve highly 
constrained problems where logic-based, optimizing approaches prove intractable [15]. Pheromone-based 
techniques have been shown to be robust and therefore appropriate for dynamic applications, such as 
network routing [15, 16].  
Sergeants and Sentinels select successful Sensors (those that are consistently rewarded for useful findings) 
as templates for spawning new Sensors.  This may be done by perturbing the parameters of a single 
Sensor’s classifier or by combining the classifiers of two or more Sensors.  
4  Interaction Examples 
CID is a mixed-initiative system that operates in a fundamentally different way from systems where 
initiative is solely human or solely automated.  Initiative for actions, handling of interruptions, and 
responsibility for various activities are all shared.  The purpose of CID’s design is to enable humans to 
function in the role they believe most appropriate at a given time.  Thus, CID’s automation is decentralized 
and flexible, accommodating many types of interactions.  In this section, we will highlight several of the characteristic interactions designed into CID.  These imply many more, but we have selected the following 
to highlight responsibilities within the system and to underscore the flexibility of human intervention they 
enable. 
4.1  Supervisor-Sensor Interaction 
The Supervisor can adjust global target parameters to make the Sensor swarm more or less responsive to 
intrusion evidence and control Sensor population.  Two of these parameters are particularly important: 
activation and crowding tolerance.  Sensors are programmed to try to achieve their target levels of these 
two quantities.  The Supervisor may use these two parameters to regulate the size of the Sensor swarm and 
adjust its responsiveness to attackers.  Activation level measures how successful a Sensor has been in 
collecting evidence useful to Sentinels.  High activation yields larger Sensor populations and diverse 
classifiers.  Crowding measures how often a Sensor encounters other Sensors while foraging. If a foraging 
Sensor senses crowding in excess of its target level, it is more likely to terminate itself reducing the 
population by removing Sensors that are no longer effective.  Highly activated Sensors and Sensors 
following pheromone trails do not check their crowding metric because high concentrations of Sensors are 
desirable where problems are being detected. Thus the swarm adapts to new problems and maintains an 
appropriate size. 
4.2  Sensor-Sentinel Interaction 
Sentinels and Sensors cooperate to reduce the interruption false positives cause for human defenders.  It is 
important to understand that even very low false positive rates can yield a tremendous amount of 
interruption that humans are not well equipped to handle [18].  Each false alarm that reaches a human 
implies an investigation may be necessary. Interactions between the Sensor swarm and the Sentinels weed 
out most of those false positives before they become alarms that interrupt the human.  However, humans 
still need visibility into the system (Section 4.5), and the system may need human guidance to classify new 
types of input (Section 4.3).  
Sentinels reward Sensors that find useful evidence by adding to their activation level.  At activation levels 
below their target, Sensors remain in foraging mode, actively following pheromone trails and seeking 
evidence that will earn them a reward from Sentinels. When a Sensor’s activation level exceeds the target, 
it stops foraging and begins dropping pheromone messages that point to the Sentinel where it was most 
greatly rewarded. As it drops pheromone, it loses activation until it enters foraging mode again.   
Consistently high activation levels indicate that a Sensor is successful and a Sentinel should select it for 
spawning.   
As the Sentinel collects more and more information from various Sensors that visit (along with information 
from other sources, Section 4.3) it will develop either a diagnosis of the problem and a means to fix it or an 
understanding that this situation is actually an acceptable variation. The Sentinel will use this knowledge to 
decide how to feed future Sensors that visit. When the Sentinel has “enough information” (the reports from 
the Sensors fit a model) on the problem, it will make a report to its Sergeant. The report to the Sergeant will 
contain the classifiers used by the Sensors that helped diagnose the problem and any other evidence it has 
that may be useful in new classifiers. 
False positives from the Sensors are not a problem; the Sentinel should feed them unless what the Sensor 
reports is known not to be a problem.  This strategy will attract more Sensors until a clearer picture can be 
constructed.  CID uses false positives to generate useful positive feedback and increase its problem-solving 
ability. 
  4.3  Sentinel-Supervisor Interactions 
Sentinels use a semi-supervised, reinforcement-learning algorithm to classify evidence received from 
visiting Sensors. They dialogue with the Supervisor (mediated through the enclave Sergeant) to train 
themselves on problems that are too difficult to decide without human guidance. The untrained Sentinel 
classifies most kinds of evidence as unknown, asking for feedback from the human Supervisor on its 
decision. Asynchronous feedback from the human supervisor provides rewards and punishments to the 
Sentinel’s reinforcement-learning algorithm. Sentinels may classify Sensor findings on a continuous scale 
(see Figure 3) from normal with high confidence (-1) to suspicious with high confidence (+1). Near zero, 
the Sentinel’s classification is more uncertain. Low confidence metric values (close to zero) between the 
suspicious and normal certainty threshold values trigger the Sentinel to ask for clarifying feedback from the 
human. When the confidence metric is outside the certainty thresholds, Sentinels will share their 
classification information with neighboring Sentinels whose machines have similar architectures. In this 
way the system avoids having humans manually diagnose the same problem again and again. 
 
Figure 3: Sentinel classification of and actions based on Sensor data. 
 
Trained Sentinels no longer require direct human feedback. Instead they use information gathered from the 
Sensors, from the Sergeant, and from other Sentinels to diagnose and repair the problem indicated. First, 
the Sentinel checks its local database of problems and solutions derived from its own experience and that of 
its neighbors for a near match. If no match exists, it requests matches from the enclave-level Sergeant 
agent. If no matching problems exist, the Sergeant will then alert the human Supervisor who can repair the 
problem manually or dismiss it as a non-problem. A special command shell or interface provided by the 
Sentinel is instrumented with learning classifiers and can learn how to repair similar problems by 
monitoring the human’s repair activities. When a new known problem and solution are discovered, the 
Sentinel stores this information in its database and passes the solution up the hierarchy to the enclave-level 
agent, the Sergeant. The report will contain the classifiers used by the Sensors that helped diagnose the 
problem and any other evidence it has that may be useful in new classifiers. 
 4.4  Sergeant-Sentinel Interactions 
Sergeants and Sentinels take charge of several areas to reduce human workload in managing large enclaves. 
Sergeants provide to the Sentinels the enclave security policy and a geographic representation of the 
enclave that defines the neighbors of each Sentinel.  Sentinels provide reports to the Sergeant on problems 
that have been solved and on Sensor types that have been particularly effective.  These interactions allow 
the human Supervisor to retain situational awareness and supervisory power but do not require the 
Supervisor to exert direct control to secure the system. 
The two-dimensional geography the Sensors move around on is maintained by the Sergeant.  The Sergeant 
builds its geography by periodically conducting a breadth-first search of the enclave and ordering the 
enclave members along a Peano-Hilbert space-filling curve.  This curve preserves network distances as 
spatial distances on the grid and minimizes the number of hops a Sensor travels on its way to a neighboring 
Sentinel.  As hosts join and leave the network, the Sergeant automatically adjusts and broadcasts the 
geography to keep it valid. 
Sentinels report to their Sergeant about Sensors that have been especially useful for detecting problems on 
their hosts.  The Sergeant uses this list of the most successful Sensors to create anticipatory classifiers 
based on combinations of highly successful classifiers.  Sergeants may also share information from this list 
of Sensors with the Sergeants of allied enclaves. 
 
4.5  Sergeant-Supervisor Interactions 
The Supervisor interacts with the Sergeant through an information visualization and graphical user 
interface that gives the Supervisor situational awareness of state of the enclave.  Utilizing the Netlogo agent 
simulation toolkit, we have simulated variations of this interface and plan to conduct user studies on which 
is most effective.  Using slider bars, the user can adjust the parameters of the environment to influence the 
behavior of the agents involved.  As mentioned earlier, the Supervisor uses this interface to adjust the 
activation and crowding tolerance target levels.   
In the simulated interface (Figure 4), the Sergeant gives a color indication of the condition of the hosts.  
Each square in the visualization represents the status of a Sentinel that reports to the Sergeant.  The color of 
the squares could indicate activity levels, security conditions, or any encoding the Supervisor prefers.  In 
the simulation we use the red, green, and blue components of the color to represent file system, memory, 
and CPU activity levels.  Systems performing similar tasks typically have similar colors.  In the figure, 
workstations appear reddish, web servers are shades of blue, and file servers appear gray.  A color change 
would indicate a change in behavior and function and could indicate a problem.    
Figure 4: Prototype of Sergeant UI 
Alternatively the coloring scheme could show the relative state of each host.  A host running in a nominal 
state would be black.  When a Sentinel reports a potential problem that needs human intervention, the 
Sergeant could color increase the red color in the square.  The color could fade as the Sentinel resolved it, 
but an increasing intensity might indicate that the need for guidance is becoming more urgent.  The 
Sergeant might then enact other means to interrupt the Supervisor and get attention to the troubled machine.  
It also might contact other neighboring enclaves to ask their Sergeants if similar problems are occurring 
there. 
Another major Sergeant-Supervisor interaction is the establishment of policy for the enclave.  We envision 
this to be a natural language and graphical interaction process where Sergeants and human Supervisors 
iteratively dialogue to arrive at policies that will enact the business and security objectives desired by the 
owners of the enclave systems. We anticipate a natural-language dialogue similar to that used by IBM’s 
SPARCLE (Server Privacy ARrchitecture and CapabiLity Enablement) policy workbench [10] which 
translates natural language requirements into a standard machine readable form.  Once the dialogue 
converges to an acceptable set of policies, the Sergeant will compile the Supervisor’s guidance into 
executable policies that direct the Sentinels in their machine configurations. 
Another important Supervisor-Sergeant interaction type involves the Supervisor delegating authority to the 
Sergeant up to specified authorization limits.  Sergeants broker agreements between organizational units on 
behalf of the Supervisors, so they must have a separate digital identification from the Supervisor they report 
to. Because they negotiate on behalf of humans they may incur liability for their owning organization. 
Thus, there must be a mechanism to describe the degree of trust the Supervisor has placed in them. The 
trust mechanism may be implemented via authorization certificates such as the Simple Public Key 
Infrastructure (SPKI) certificate (RFC 2692, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2692.txt) which supports 
authorization and delegation up to specified limits. For instance, if a Sergeant wishes to negotiate a change 
in the Service Level Agreement (SLA) its unit has from an Internet Service Provider (ISP) the cost of the change would be evaluated. The ISP could ask the Sergeant whether it had sufficient trust to negotiate the 
change autonomously. The Sergeant would present authorization credentials, signed by its Supervisor 
showing the dollar amount (or whatever unit) it is entrusted with to make decisions of this sort. If the 
authorization level was sufficient, the ISP would go ahead with the change. If the Sergeant lacked sufficient 
authorization, the ISP could require the human Supervisor’s signature on the change. The Supervisor would 
probably start out trusting the Sergeant very little, but as the Sergeant gained experience and demonstrated 
reliability, the Supervisor might increase its delegated authorization limits.  
4.6  Sergeant-Sergeant Interactions 
Sergeants are the only software agents that communicate with entities external to the enclave such as 
outside resources and other Sergeants.  Outside resources such as virus definitions and attack profiles 
would assist the Sergeant in formulating guidance for the Sentinels.  An updated attack profile would be 
sent to all Sentinels in the system so they can begin watching for them based on Sensor reports.  Likewise, 
if a new attack is identified and resolved on the system, the Sergeant would pass this information along to 
allied Sergeants in neighboring enclaves (those it trusts based on the mechanisms in 4.5).  The information 
passed might be a simple description or it might contain parameters and classifiers actually used by the 
Sensors that helped the system identify the novel attack (or effectively deal with known attacks).  Sergeants 
in charge of other enclaves could then instantiate these Sensors in their own enclaves.  A benefit of this 
approach is that the Sensor definition can be shared without sharing the data from any machine within the 
enclave and avoiding data exfiltration or violation of proprietary information.   
 
4.7  Sensor Agent Management 
Decentralized, pheromone-based systems have been demonstrated to simply and effectively solve highly 
constrained problems where logic-based, optimizing approaches prove intractable. Figure 4 shows the 
simulation model of a pheromone based system we built to investigate tradeoffs among pheromone 
implementations. Central to any system that relies on swarming sensors is the ability to communicate 
information and influence action. The CID framework uses a pheromone-based system for inter-Sensor 
communications that has been demonstrated to be simple and efficient [15]. This decentralized 
communication approach allows Sensors to not only achieve the local goal of finding food, but also 
collectively achieve the global objective of discovering inflected computers in a dynamic environment. 
Pheromone-based techniques have been shown to be robust and therefore appropriate for dynamic 
applications, such as network routing [15][16]. This is an important feature for CID since the number of 
computers and their security status (e.g. infected or clean) will change over time. As previously discussed, 
a Sensor that discovers pheromone has a probability of following it that is related to the pheromone 
strength.  The rate of pheromone decay and how pheromone is potentially overwritten will impact the 
system adaptiveness, as discussed in [15][16]. 
5  Related Work 
The mixed-initiative approach is not common in cyber security applications.  CID blends the initiative of 
humans and a hierarchy of agents to avoid the extremes of either marginalizing the human in favor of 
black-box machine intelligence or including the human in the wrong loop, too close to the problem so that 
the system speed is bounded by human reaction time. 
In earlier research [20] interviews with operators of computer systems we interviewed agreed that a “five 
nines” (99.999%) reduction of information was necessary for them to retain situational awareness.  System 
administrators and security officers we interviewed indicated that their preference was to see changes in the 
visualization only when something that required human attention occurred.  Feedback from other clients 
revealed that operators find even a hundred alerts per day too taxing.  Clearly, operational staff need to 
reduce the amount of workload required by the available data, and teaming with autonomous agents is an 
excellent potential solution. The hierarchical arrangement of humans and various types of agents has been proposed in a variety of 
forms. Ibrahim [17] proposes a network management system that utilizes a hierarchy of mobile agents to 
manage a distributed system while reducing bandwidth consumption.  Parunak [6] proposes a 
heterogeneous hierarchy to solve highly constrained military movement problems. However, the human 
mostly serves as an observer in these systems and has very limited interaction with the agents. 
The network management system proposed by Ray [19] proposes a similar arrangement of agents as well 
as keeping the human as a high level policy maker.  Our system is further decentralized with no concept of 
a “home base” for our mobile (and non-cognitive) Sensors.  
6  Conclusions and Future Research 
Thus far we have focused our research mainly on the Sentinel and Sensor behavior in our simulated 
environment thoroughly mapping out the behavior of the Sensors and their interactions with the Sentinels.  
We have created a demonstration system of the Sensor-Sentinel levels in JADE and have created vertical 
prototypes of interactions at the Supervisor, Sergeant, and Sentinel levels.  However, we have several areas 
of future research we intend to pursue such as: 
•  Defining the dialogue between Supervisor and Sergeant that translates human guidance into 
unambiguous policy for the Sentinels 
•  Experimenting with our practical Sensor-Sentinel demonstration on a computer cluster  
•  Conducting usability studies on the prototype Sergeant user interface 
•  Learning to generalize knowledge gained from solutions to problems that share similarities 
•  Testing the framework against real-world attacks on the systems being monitored 
The CID framework keeps the human in the right loop via a hierarchy of software agents that implements 
high-level policy and handles low-level events.  The framework resolves issues in a decentralized manner 
at the lowest possible level to minimize alerts that interrupt the human user. This builds user trust in the 
system and improves system efficiency. The efficiency realized by CID’s mixed-initiative approach is 
highly scalable and difficult to disrupt.  We believe that by sharing system control with a hierarchy of 
agents and utilizing the truly adaptive capabilities of swarm intelligence we can greatly enhance the 
security of our computational infrastructures and the societies that depend on them. 
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